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THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
INTRODUCTION BY WHITMAN H. RIDGWAY*
The role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system has
been the subject of lively debate over the past two hundred years.
Article III of the Constitution vested all judicial power "in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish."' The supremacy clause of
article VI made the Constitution the supreme law of the land and
bound the state and federal governments to it.2 What was left un-
said, however, was which branch of government has the responsibil-
ity to decide whether a law is constitutional.
The founding fathers considered alternative methods to deal
with laws deemed to be inconsistent with the Constitution. In the
Virginia Plan presented at Philadelphia in May 1787, James Madison
proposed the creation of a Council of Revision, composed of the
Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, to ex-
amine federal and state acts and to reject those which it found want-
ing.3 The founding fathers rejected this plan, adopting one dividing
such power between the Executive,4 who could veto congressional
legislation, and the judiciary.5
Both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists recognized that the
power of judicial review was implicit in the design of the Constitu-
tion. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78: "A con-
stitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its
meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding
from the legislative body."6 Anti-Federalist writers, such as Brutus,
made essentially the same point: "[T]he supreme court has the
power, in the last resort, to determine all questions that may arise in
the course of legal discussion, on the meaning and construction of
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1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
2. Id. at art. VI, cl. 2.
3. See Virginia Resolutions Presented to the Constitutional Convention on May 29,
1787, reprinted in M. KAMMEN, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 24 (1986).
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
5. See id. at art. III, § 2.
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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the constitution."' 7 The First Congress affirmed the principle ofju-
dicial review in section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,8 which de-
fined the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
The most forceful statement of judicial review was made by
Chief Justice John Marshall. He wrote in Marbury v. Madison9 as
follows:
[I]f a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the
law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that
the court must either decide that case conformably to the
law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably with the
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must deter-
mine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.
This is the very essence of judicial duty.' 0
There was only one logical conclusion to this problem: "[A] law
repugnant to the constitution is void; and ... courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.""
Several Presidents have dissented from this view. While
Thomas Jefferson was unhappy with Marshall's interpretation at the
time, Andrew Jackson would make the most vociferous challenge to
judicial supremacy. Contrary to the ratification debate, which
placed the will of the majority in the legislature, Jackson argued that
the people gave the President an electoral mandate that included
deciding what was constitutional and what was not. 2 Such a
majoritarian view has been echoed by other strong Presidents.
The most recent public debate on the proper role of the
Supreme Court and the doctrine of judicial review has been evident
in speeches by Attorney General Edwin Meese III, and Supreme
Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. In a lecture at Tulane Univer-
sity in October 1986 Mr. Meese observed:
Once we understand the distinction between constitutional
law and the Constitution, once we see that constitutional
decisions need not be seen as the last words in constitu-
tional construction, once we comprehend that these deci-
sions do not necessarily determine future public policy-
once we see all of this, we can grasp a correlative point:
7. Brutus, Essay No. XII, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 168 (H. Storing ed. & M. Dry abr.
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11. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
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